American Czar

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ASPA as an organization.

By Zach Curinga
January 13, 2025

“Heavy lies the head that wears the crown.” – Henry VI, Part 2, William Shakespeare

It has universally been the case that political leaders seek out expert advice and often delegate tasks to these viziers. After all, this is done to make good on individual political campaign promises and to confer legitimacy on policy actions taken overall by the executive and legislative branches. However, in the current political climate, it has become increasingly difficult to obtain expert input, especially when time is of the essence. The appointment process has become drawn out, and key positions often remain vacant; in some instances, roles are never properly filled. This has left the executive to fill positions in unconventional ways, giving rise to the role of the “czar.”

The background of the rise of the “czar” relates to the confluence of factors has led to decision-making power being concentrated in the executive branch. A notable recent and counterintuitive example is the Chevron deference being struck down in favor of the independent judgment of the Judiciary. Although the Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises rested upon rule-making procedures established by the Administrative Procedures Act and its progeny, it is difficult to ignore that—for decades—Chevron critics’ main concern dealt with Congress delegating its power to agencies. Congress’s delegation to executive agencies has been given significant discretion in rule promulgation; additionally, with more delegation to the executive, this has meant heightened presidential influence in the rule-making process, such as through executive orders and presidential memoranda.

Thus, the delegation doctrine appears to have arisen as antithetical to the Chevron deference, presuming that Congress cannot delegate its authority to executive agencies, no matter the clarity in the mandate. After all, the “major questions doctrine” whittled away at this deference for the past several years. Moreover, the current surge in populism and a historically ineffectual Congress all but guarantees that delegation and execution of administrative action is unlikely to be effective. Importantly, as there is a reflection of a broader distrust in institutions, the effect of Loper Bright Enterprises may, in fact, embolden a President to exert more unilateral action to accomplish his objectives in lieu of patiently seeking Congressional approval or expert advice. After all, the executive branch does have other tools at its disposal that allow it to exert power and bypass the legislative branch:  a major tool of the modern era has been the appointments of so-called, “czars.”

The original usage of the term, “czar” in the United States was pejorative, aimed at an official that was resisting a policy directive by then-President Andrew Johnson. Over time, however, this term has been used mainly by the media to refer to executive appointments that do not go before the Senate for approval. Of course, this has been subject to a debate echoing that of Chevron:  critics point to the appointment clause of the Constitution regarding “the advice and consent of the Senate,” while proponents cite the exception clause, “Congress may by law vest the appointments of such inferior officers, as they think proper.”

Understandably, this has led to considerable tension, such as: What constitutes an “inferior officer?” The Court has deliberated the question and has often made the legal standard murkier. Thematically, one can see that these policy positions can be seen to coordinate, delegate and advise. The Presidents that have appointed the most czars have been those facing massive crises: Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt with the Great Depression, George W. Bush with the Wars in the Middle East and Barack Obama with the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, an “inferior officer” has tended to be an appointed position that answers to the executive or head of a department and is often charged with a very narrow policy area. Examples include the banal “carp czar” and include the “Ebola czar.”

What has been striking is that the czar position has been increasingly tasked with the production of making the policy rules. Controversially, in the Obama administration, the “pay czar” issued rules regarding private sector executive compensation during the financial crisis. Although this rule was generated largely with the input and consent of the executive, it was seen as a significant overreach of an individual that had not gone before the Senate for confirmation. Importantly, the input and consent of executives regarding rules about matters, such as pay, may not always be so benevolent—after all, it does not require a significant stretch of the imagination to see how such a process can be used to benefit companies at the expense of taxpayers.

Given the above, it is surprising to see that there is very little literature that has analyzed the czar position as it relates to public administration. Mere mentions in major public administration journals appear to be scant. This leaves open not only the question of constitutionality, but the efficiency and effectiveness of such a concentrated position. It is empirically unresolved how much of an impact the czar position actually has. Commentators have noted the symbolic nature of their appointments as those in this “czar” category appear increasingly unqualified. This also reflects the appeal of staffing an administration with individuals that do not undergo the traditional level of scrutiny and are dedicated to very specific policy problems. With a new administration taking the reigns, this question will become increasingly prescient as the erosion of expertise continues.  

---

Author: Zachary Curinga is currently a PhD student at Rutgers-Newark, School of Public Affairs and Administration, (SPAA). His research interests include nonprofit management, organizational change, public health nutrition, and disability equity. He can be contacted by email at [email protected]

(4 votes, average: 5.00 out of 5)
Loading...