Leadership and Decision-Making: The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ASPA as an organization.

By Richard F. Keevey
October 21, 2024

Introduction and Overview

Both the process and outcome(s) of public decision-making are key to the successful operation of  government. Asking the right questions; accurately accessing the information available; surrounding decision makers with diverse, informed and experienced advisers; and exercising good judgment in weighing the information are all a part of the process. All these factors were evident during one of the most critical events in U.S. history.

October 2024 marks the 62nd anniversary of the U.S.-Cuban Missile Crisis. Those 13 days were the closest the world has come to nuclear war. War-time decision making is always difficult and fraught with challenges. Indeed, it is the apex of public decision-making. Such was the case when the Soviet Union secretly introduced a small number of nuclear weapons into Cuba, with ships loaded with more nuclear weapons already sea bound. Some might argue it was President Kennedy’s finest hour.

When an American military plane discovered the missiles, a major crisis erupted. President Kennedy immediately formed a group of advisors (the so-called X-Com Committee) to consider a path of action, while keeping these deliberations confidential to avoid panic until all reasonable and appropriate options could be identified and considered.

Some of Kennedy’s advisors urged an immediate air strike and a follow-up invasion of Cuba. This was also the initial inclination of the president, and, in fact, he began to mobilize troops. Fortunately for the world, he continued with deliberations. Kennedy decided instead on a naval blockade of Cuba, while also initiating “back-door” and secret negotiations with Soviet Premier Khrushchev.

Ultimately, the crisis subsided when the Soviet ships carrying the additional missiles turned back at the blockade without incident and Khrushchev agreed to remove the existing missiles from Cuba. As part of the secret negotiations, the United States agreed to remove our Jupiter nuclear missiles located in Turkey, aimed at the Soviet Union and gave public assurance that the United States would not invade Cuba.

Actions Short of Disaster

In hindsight, the strategy employed by Kennedy sounds like a clear-cut success. However, the outcome was not as rosy and uneventful as it appears in that several incidences that developed along the way suggest that we were close to nuclear disaster. An unwise decision on either side could have resulted in nuclear war. Consider the following situations:

• The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that there were 15,000 soviet troops in Cuba, but it was revealed later there were 45,000 troops. Even more amazing, it was later determined that short-range tactical nuclear weapons had already been installed in Cuba. As such, any “pre-emptive” invasion of Cuba could have been disastrous.
• A US military plane was shot down over Cuba during these days of confrontation and deliberations. The military leaders believed the political leadership in Moscow had authorized the firing and our military pushed for a retaliatory response. In fact, Khrushchev did not authorize the action and was enraged at the decision of his generals. However, and even more important, President Kennedy rejected the advice of his military leaders and resisted an attack on Cuba.
• On October 27, 1962, an American aircraft on a routine mission to keep an eye on Soviet nuclear testing inadvertently took a wrong turn at the North Pole and ended up in Soviet airspace. The Soviets sent MIG fighters to shoot down aircraft. Concurrently, the U.S. command in Alaska scrambled nuclear-armed fighter-jet interceptors. Fortunately, our aircraft ‘escaped’ Soviet airspace before any overt military confrontation.

Some Reflections

Presidential decision-making during times of war often occurs under a veil of secrecy and uncertainty that even the best intelligence cannot comprehend. Geoffrey Wheatcroft  in his article ”Denial of What One Knows” provides a useful taxonomy of knowledge, specifically dividing it into: “known-knowns” (things we know); ”known unknowns” (things we are aware that we do not know); and ”unknown unknowns” (things we do not know, where we do not recognize our ignorance). It is this last category that is the most dangerous, and the easiest to overlook. Consider what was unknown during the confrontations and deliberations of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In his book, Overconfidence and War, Dominic Johnson coins the phrase ‘positive illusions,’ whereby people a) think of themselves as above average, b) display unrealistic optimism, c) show exaggerated bravado, d) assume that they have more control over situations than they actually do and e) underestimate the potential for action by the other side. Consider General Custer’s’ alleged cry at  the battle of Little Big Horn, “Hurrah boys, we have them”;  General MacArthur’s belief that the Chinese would not intervene in Korea; and Khrushchev’s belief that the Soviet missiles planned for Cuba would not be discovered, and the situation would be a fait accompli once they were operational.

Graham Allison, a former professor at Harvard and the author of The Essence of Decision Making, argues that an effective way to avoid ‘positive illusions’ is to have a wide variety of opinions that are evaluated against reality. The different X-Com participants (each with their separate roles and perspectives) all contributed to mitigating positive illusions.

Concluding Thoughts

After the crisis, Attorney General Robert Kennedy identified a few key facts that contributed to a successful resolution to include: 1) maximize time for decision-making and adversary responses, 2) inhibit initial response tendencies, 3) gather as much information as possible, 4) entertain a diversity of opinions, 5) use all available background and expertise on the adversary, 6) ensure civilian control of the military, 7) deliberate carefully, 8) provide the adversary a “face saving” way to comply with your requirements and 9) build in safeguards against inadvertent escalation.

The result of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the realization that a nuclear holocaust was entirely possible. Thankfully, both Kennedy and Khrushchev abandoned any “positive illusions” they may have had, especially regarding winning or even surviving a nuclear war.

One final observation about President Kennedy. Had someone else been president in October 1962, the outcome might have been vastly different. Kennedy derived his capacity for leadership and good judgment from his experiences, both before and during his time in the White House. His fortitude for survival was demonstrated when his PT-109 patrol boat was destroyed in WWII, and his Bay-of-Pigs fiasco of April 1961 taught him to be skeptical of assurances of spy specialists and military leadership.

Interestingly, earlier in 1962, Kennedy had just read Barbara Tuchman’s classic history, The Guns of August, which details how Europe blundered into WWI, particularly the passage when a German leader asks why this war broke out and receives the reply “If only one knew.” While many public decisions are important, most do not carry the significance of war-time decisions. The potential for disaster can be huge, which places great weight on both the decision-making process and outcome(s).

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Author: Rich held two presidential appointments – one with Senate confirmation. He was appointed by two NJ governors  from each political party as State Budget Director. He was Director of the Policy Research Institute at Princeton University; and was an executive officer of a nuclear missile unit in Europe. Currently, Rich is a senior policy fellow at Rutgers University.    

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