Network Resilience in an Era of Policrisis

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ASPA as an organization.

By Hanvit Kim
February 20, 2026

Contemporary crises rarely remain confined to a single policy domain or jurisdiction. Public managers increasingly operate in a policrisis environment, where multiple disruptions unfold simultaneously and reinforce one another through deeply interdependent systems. In such settings, cascading effects are not exceptions. A wildfire, for instance, extends beyond fire suppression to affect energy systems, public health, housing and displacement and governance capacity as multiple actors are forced to respond under pressure.

For example, during recent wildfires in Los Angeles County, fire suppression was only one dimension of the crisis. Power shutoffs intended to reduce ignition risk disrupted critical infrastructure and communication systems, smoke exposure generated widespread public health concerns and evacuation orders triggered large-scale displacement and sheltering challenges. Addressing these interconnected impacts required coordination among fire agencies, utilities, public health departments, local governments, nonprofits and community organizations. In this context, the capacity of individual agencies, while necessary, is insufficient. No single public organization possesses the resources, information or authority required to manage such complex and cascading crises alone. Interorganizational networks enable actors to pool resources, integrate fragmented information and coordinate action across institutional and sectoral boundaries.

In an era of policrisis, resilience is no longer an organizational attribute. It is a networked capacity.

Network Resilience

Network resilience shifts attention from individual organizations to the interorganizational networks that connect them. It asks whether these networks can function under stress, limit cascading failures and adjust as conditions evolve. I define network resilience through the Three A’s: anticipation, absorption and adaptation. Together, these capabilities capture whether interorganizational networks can anticipate emerging disruptions, absorb shocks as they unfold and adapt roles and relationships as conditions change.

Anticipation, as used here, refers to a network’s ability to detect early signals of disruption and mitigate risks in advance. In resilient networks, warning signs are not confined to a single agency but circulate through formal and informal channels, enabling earlier and more coordinated action.

Absorption reflects a network’s capacity to distribute shocks across multiple actors, preventing overload or single points of failure. When responsibilities, resources and decision-making authority are shared and connected, disruptions are less likely to cascade uncontrollably through the system.

Adaptation captures a network’s ability to reconfigure roles, relationships and decision processes in real time. Rather than rigidly following predefined plans, resilient networks adjust responsibilities, bypass bottlenecks and improvise within shared goals as situations evolve. Importantly, network resilience does not imply rigid coordination or centralized control. Highly resilient networks combine shared situational awareness with agile and adaptive responses. They rely on trust, connected redundancy and leadership that enables coordination rather than dictates it. In this sense, resilience is less about executing a predefined script and more about collective problem-solving under uncertainty.

Three Key Lessons for Practitioners

First, anticipation must extend beyond formal plans. Early warning is a network function, not an agency task. Signals of emerging crises surface unevenly across organizations. Networks that promote routine information sharing and cross-sector communication are better positioned to anticipate cascading effects before they escalate.

Second, agility and adaptation matter more than rigid compliance. In complex crises, strict adherence to predefined roles can hinder effective response. Resilient networks allow actors to adjust responsibilities, bypass bottlenecks and improvise within shared goals. This adaptive capacity depends on trust built through prior interaction and leadership that prioritizes coordination over control.

Finally, redundancy is a strength only when it is connected. Overlapping responsibilities across agencies and sectors can enhance resilience, but only if those actors are linked through relationships. Unconnected redundancy creates confusion. Connected redundancy creates flexibility.

Implications for Policy and Practice

Recognizing both the limits and the potential of networks is essential. Networks do not automatically perform well under stress. They require deliberate investment, sustained maintenance and repeated practice. Planning remains essential, but not because plans perfectly predict future crises. As President Dwight D. Eisenhower observed, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.” The value of planning lies in the process itself. Through planning, actors learn one another’s roles, identify interdependencies and surface hidden assumptions. Exercises and training play a similarly critical role. Practice builds familiarity, trust and shared mental models across organizational boundaries. In networked crisis management, practice does not eliminate failure, but it makes adaptation faster and coordination more effective. Practice may not make responses perfect, but it prepares systems to perform under imperfection. For public managers, the implication is clear. Investments in resilience should extend beyond individual agencies to the relationships, routines and governance structures that enable networks to anticipate, absorb and adapt together. In an era of policrises and deep interdependence, resilient public systems will be defined by how well they plan, practice and respond as networks.

Acknowledgment: This paper presents a synopsis of a larger study conducted as part of the author’s dissertation research.

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 Author: Hanvit Kim is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Public Administration at the University of Central Florida. His research focuses on network governance and emergency management, with particular attention to network resilience in complex and interdependent crisis settings.

 

 

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